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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 490.-0CTOBER TERM, 1965. 
Samuel H. Sheppard, Petitioner, 
v. 
E. L. Maxwell, Warden. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit. 
[June 6, 1966.] 
MR. JusTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This federal habeas corpus application involves the 
question whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial 
in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of 
his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect 
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and 
prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.1 The 
United States District Court held that he was not af-
forded a fair trial and granted the writ subject to the 
State's right to put Sheppard to trial again, 231 F. Supp. 
37 (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1964). The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, 346 F. 2d 707 
(1965). We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 916 (1966). 
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a fair 
trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
I. 
Marilyn Sheppard, petitioner's pregnant wife, was 
bludgeoned to death in the upstairs bedroom of their lake-
1 Sheppard was convicted in 1954 in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. His conviction was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 
N. E. 2d 471 (1955), and the Ohio Supreme Court, 165 Ohio St. 
293, 135 N. E. 2d 340 (1956). We denied certiorari on the original 
appeal. 352 U. S. 910 (1956). 
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2 SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 
shore home in Bay Village, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland. 
On the day of the tragedy, July 4, 1954, Sheppard pieced 
together for several local officials the following story: He 
and his wife had entertained neighborhood friends, the 
Aherns, on the previous evening at their home. After 
dinner they watched television in the living room. Shep-
pard became drowsy and dozed off to sleep on a couch. 
Later, Marilyn partially awoke him saying that she was 
going to bed. The next thing he remembered was hear-
ing his wife cry out in the early morning hours. He hur-
ried upstairs and in the dim light from the hall saw a 
"form" standing next to his wife's bed. As he struggled 
with the "form" he was struck on the back of the neck 
and rendered unconscious. On regaining his senses he 
found himself on the floor next to his wife's bed. He 
raised up, looked at her, took her pulse and "felt that 
she was gone." He then went to his son's room and 
found him unmolested. Hearing a noise he hurried 
downstairs. He saw a "form" running out the door and 
pursued it to the lake shore. He grappled with it on the 
beach and again lost consciousness. Upon his recovery 
he was laying face down with the lower portion of his 
body in the water. He returned to his home, checked the 
pulse on his wife's neck, and "determined or thought that 
she was gone." 2 He then went downstairs and called a 
neighbor, Mayor Houk of Bay Village. The Mayor and 
his wife came over at once, found Sheppard slumped in 
an easy chair downstairs and asked, "What happened?" 
Sheppard replied: "I don't know but somebody ought to 
try to do something for Marilyn." Mrs. Houk imme-
diately went up to the bedroom. The Mayor told Shep-
pard, "Get hold of yourself. Can you tell me what hap-
2 The several witnesses to whom Sheppard narrated his experi-
ences differ in their description of various details. Sheppard claimed 
the vagueness of his perception was caused by his sudden awakening, 
the dimness of the light, and his loss of consciousness. 
\ 
II 
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 3 
pened?" Sheppard then related the above-outlined 
events. After Mrs. Houk discovered the body, the 
Mayor called the local police, Dr. Richard Sheppard, peti-
tioner's brother, and Aherns. The local police were the 
first to arrive. They in turn notified the Coroner and 
Cleveland police. Richard Sheppard then arrived, deter-
mined that Marilyn was dead, examined his brother's in-
juries, and removed him to the nearby clinic operated by 
the Sheppard family. 3 When the Coroner, the Cleveland 
police and other officials arrived, the house and surround-
ing area were thoroughly searched, the rooms of the 
house were photographed, and many persons, including 
the Houks and the Aherns, were interrogated. The 
Sheppard home and premises were taken into "protective 
custody" and remained so until after the trial.4 
From the outset officials focused suspicion on Shep-
pard. After a search of the house and premises on the 
morning of the tragedy, Dr. Gerber, the Coroner, is re-
ported-and it is undenied-to have told his men, "Well, 
it is evident the doctor did this, so let's go get the con-
fession out of him." He proceeded to interrogate and 
examine Sheppard while the latter was under sedation 
in his hospital room. On the same occasion, the Coroner 
was given the clothes Sheppard wore at the time of the 
tragedy together with the personal items in them. Later 
that afternoon Chief Eaton and two Cleveland police 
officers interrogated Sheppard at some length, confront-
ing him with evidence and demanding explanations. 
Asked by Officer Shotke to take a lie detector test, Shep-
pard said he would if it were reliable. Shotke replied 
that it was "infallible" and "you might as well tell us 
3 Sheppard was suffering from severe pain in his neck, a swollen 
eye, and shock. 
4 But newspaper photographers and reporters were permitted 
access to Sheppard's home from time to time and took pictures 
throughout the premises. 
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all about it now." At the end of the interrogation 
Shotke told Sheppard: "I think you killed your wife." 
Still later in the same afternoon a physician sent by the 
Coroner was permitted to make a detailed examination 
of Sheppard. Until the Coroner's inquest on July 22, 
at which time he was subpoenaed, Sheppard made him-
self available for frequent and extended questioning 
without the presence of an attorney. 
On July 7, the day of Marilyn Sheppard's funeral, a 
newspaper story appeared in which Assistant County At-
torney Mahon-later the chief prosecutor of Sheppard-
sharply criticized the refusal of the Sheppard family to 
permit his immediate questioning. From there on head-
line stories repeatedly stressed Sheppard's lack of coop-
eration with the police and other officials. Under the 
headline "Testify Now In Death, Bay Doctor Is Or-
dered," one story described a visit by Coroner Gerber 
and four police officers to the hospital on July 8. When 
Sheppard insisted that his lawyer be present, the Coroner 
wrote out a subpoena and served it on him. Sheppard 
then agreed to submit to questioning without counsel and 
the subpoena was torn up. The officers questioned him 
for seyeral hours. On July 9, Sheppard, at the request 
of the Coroner, re-enacted the tragedy at his home before 
the Coroner, police officers, and a group of newsmen, who 
apparently were invited by the Coroner. The home was 
locked so that Sheppard was obliged to wait outside until 
the Coroner arrived. Sheppard's performance was re-
ported in detail by the news media along with photo-
graphs. The newspapers also played up Sheppard's 
refusal to take a lie detector test and "the protective ring" 
thrown up by his family. Front-page newspaper head-
lines announced on the same day that "Doctor Balks At 
Lie Test; Retells Story." A column opposite that story 
contained an "exclusive" interview with Sheppard head-
lined: " 'Loved My Wife, She Loved Me,' Sheppard Tells 
I 
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News Reporters." The next day, another headline story 
disclosed that Sheppard had "again late yesterday re-
fused to take a lie detector test" and quoted an Assistant 
County Attorney as saying that "at the end of a nine-
hour questioning of Dr. Sheppard, I felt he was now 
ruling [a test] out completely." But subsequent news-
paper articles reported that the Coroner was still push-
ing Sheppard for a lie detector test. More stories ap-
peared when Sheppard would not allow authorities to 
inject him with "truth serum." 5 
On the 20th, the "editorial artillery" opened fire with 
a front-page charge that somebody is "getting away with 
murder." The editorial attributed the ineptness of the 
investigation to "friendships, relationships, hired law-
yers, a husband who ought to have been subjected in-
stantly to the same third degree to which any person 
under similar circumstances is subjected .... " The 
following day, July 21, another page-one editorial was 
headed: "Why No Inquest? Do It Now, Dr. Gerber." 
The Coroner called an inquest the same day and sub-
poenaed Sheppard. It was staged the next day in a 
school gymnasium; the Coroner presided with the County 
Prosecutor as his advisor and two detectives as bailiffs. 
In the front of the room was a long table occupied by 
reporters, television and radio personnel, and broadcast-
ing equipment. The hearing was broadcast with live 
microphones placed at the Coroner's seat and the wit-
ness stand. A swarm of reporters and photographers 
attended. Sheppard was brought into the room by police 
who searched him in full view of several hundred spec-
tators. Sheppard's counsel were present during the 
three-day inquest but were not permitted to participate. 
5 At the same time, the newspapers reported that other possible 
suspects had been "cleared" by lie detector tests. One of these per-
sons was quoted as saying that he could not understand why an 
innocent man would refuse to take such a test. 
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When Sheppard's chief counsel attempted to place some 
documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected from 
the room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and 
kisses from ladies in the audience. Sheppard was ques-
tioned for five and one-half hours about his actions on 
the night of the murder, his married life, and a love affair 
with Susan Hayes.6 At the end of the hearing the Cor-
oner announced that he "could" order Sheppard held for 
the grand jury, but did not do so. 
Throughout this period the newspapers emphasized 
evidence that tended to incriminate Sheppard and 
pointed out discrepancies in his statements to authorities. 
At the same time, Sheppard made many public state-
ments to the press and wrote feature articles asserting 
his innocence.7 During the inquest on July 26, a head-
line in large type stated: "Kerr [Captain of the Cleve-
land Police] Urges Sheppard's Arrest." In the story, 
Detective McArthur "disclosed that scientific tests at 
the Sheppard home have definitely Bstablished that the 
killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bed-
room to the downstairs section," a circumstance casting 
doubt on Sheppard's accounts of the murder. No such 
evidence was produced at trial. The newspapers also 
delved into Sheppard's personal life. Articles stressed 
his extra-marital love affairs as a motive for the crime. 
The newspapers portrayed Sheppard as a Lothario, fully 
explored his relationship with Susan Hayes, and named 
a number of other women who were allegedly involved 
with him. The testimony at trial never showed that 
"The newspapers had heavily emphasized Sheppard's illicit affair 
with Susan Hayes, and the fact that he had initially lied about it. 
7 A number of articles calculated to evoke sympathy for Sheppard 
were printed, such as the letters Sheppard wrote to his son while in 
jail. These stories often appeared together with news coverage 
\Yhich was unfavorable to him. 
\ 
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Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides the one 
with Susan Hayes. 
On July 28, an editorial entitled "Why Don't Police 
Quiz Top Suspect" demanded that Sheppard be taken 
to police headquarters. It described him in the follow-
ing language: 
"Now proved under oath to be a liar, still free to 
go about his business, shielded by his family, pro-
tected by a smart lawyer who has made monkeys 
of .the police and authorities, carrying a gun part of 
the time, left free to do whatever he pleases . . . ." 
A front-page editorial on July 30 asked: "Why Isn't 
Sam Sheppard in Jail?" It was later titled "Quit Stall-
ing-Bring Him In." After calling Sheppard "the most 
unusual murder suspect ever sBen around these parts" 
the article said that "[e]xcept for some superficial ques-
tioning during Coroner Sam Gerber's inquest he has been 
scot-free of any official grilling .... " It asserted that 
he was "surrounded by an iron curtain of protection 
[and] concealment." 
That night at 10 o'clock Sheppard was arrested at his 
father's home on a charge of murder. He was taken to 
the Bay Village City Hall where hundreds of people, 
newscasters, photographers and reporters were awaiting 
his arrival. He was immediately arraigned-having been 
denied a temporary delay to secure the presence of 
counsel-and bound over to the grand jury. 
The publicity then grew in intensity until his indict-
ment on August 17. Typical of the coverage during this 
period is a front-page interview entitled: "DR. SAM: 'I 
Wish There Was Something I Could Get Off My Chest--
but There Isn't.'" Unfavorable publicity included 
items such as a cartoon of the body of a sphinx with 
Sheppard's head and the legend below: " 'I Will Do 
Everything In My Power to Help Solve This Terrible 
8 SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 
Murder.' -Dr. Sam Sheppard." Headlines announced, 
inter alia, that: "Doctor Evidence is Ready for Jury," 
"Corrigan Tactics Stall Quizzing," "Sheppard 'Gay Set' 
Is Revealed By Houk," "Blood Is Found In Garage," 
"New Murder Evidence Is Found, Police Claim," "Dr. 
Sam Faces Quiz At Jail On Marilyn's Fear Of Him." On 
August 18, an article appeared under the headline "Dr. 
Sam Writes His Own Story." And reproduced across the 
entire front page was a portion of the typed statement 
signed by Sheppard: "I am not guilty of the murder of 
my wife, Marilyn. How could I, who have been trained 
to help people and devote my life to saving life, commit 
such a terrible and revolting crime?" We do not detail 
the coverage further. There are five volumes filled with 
similar clippings from each of the three Cleveland news-
papers covering the period from the murder until Shep-
pard's conviction in December 1954. The record in-
cludes no excerpts from newscasts on radio and television 
but since space was reserved in the courtroom for these 
media we assume that their coverage was equally large. 
II. 
With this background the case came on for trial two 
weeks before the November general election at which 
the chief prosecutor was a candidate for municipal judge 
and the presiding judge, Judge Blythin, was a candidate 
to succeed himself. Twenty-five days before the case 
was set, a list of 75 veniremen were called as prospective 
jurors. This list, including the addresses of each venire-
man, was published in all three Cleveland newspapers. 
As a consequence, anonymous letters and telephone calls, 
as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending 
prosecution were received by all of the prospective jurors. 
The selection of the jury began on October 18, 1954. 
The courtroom in which the trial was held measured 
26 by 48 feet. A long temporary table was set up inside 
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 9 
the bar, in back of the single counsel table. It ran the 
width of the courtroom, parallel to the bar railing, with 
one end less than three feet from the jury box. Approxi-
mately 20 representatives of newspapers and wire services 
were assigned seats at this table by the court. Behind 
the bar railing there were four rows of benches. These 
seats were likewise assigned by the court for the entire 
trial. The first row was occupied by representatives of 
television and radio stations, and the second and third 
rows by reporters from out-of-town newspapers and mag-
azines. One side of the last row, which accommodated 
14 people, was assigned to Sheppard's family and the 
other to Marilyn's. The public was permitted to fill 
vacancies in this row on special passes only. Repre-
sentatives of the news media also used all the rooms on 
the courtroom floor, including the room where cases were 
ordinarily called and assigned for trial. Private tele-
phone lines and telegraphic equipment were installed 
in these rooms so that reports from the trial could be 
speeded to the papers. Station WSRS was permitted to 
set up broadcasting facilities on the third floor of the 
courthouse next door r to the jury room, where the jury 
rested during recesses in the trial and deliberated. News-
~asts were made from this room throughout the trial, 
and while the jury reached its verdict. 
On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, 
television and newsreel cameras were occasionally used 
to take motion pictures of the participants in the trial, 
including the jury and the judge. Indeed, one television 
broadcast carried a staged interview of the judge as he 
entered the courthouse. In the corridors outside the 
courtroom there was a host of photographers and tele-
vision personnel with flash cameras, portable lights and 
motion picture cameras. This group photographed the 
prospective jurors during selection of the jury. After 
the trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were 
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photographed and televised whenever they entered or 
left the courtroom. Sheppard was brought to the court-
room about 10 minutes before each session began; he was 
surrounded by reporters and extensively photographed 
for the newspapers and television. A rule of court pro-
hibited picture-taking in the courtroom during the actual 
sessions of the court, but no restraints were put on pho-
tographers during recesses, which were taken once each 
morning and afternoon, with a longer period for lunch. 
All of these arrangements with the news media and 
their massive coverage of the trial continued during the 
entire nine weeks of the trial. The courtroom remained 
crowded to capacity with representatives of news media. 
Their movement in and out of the courtroom often 
caused so much confusion that, despite the loud speaker 
system installed in the courtroom, it was difficult for the 
witnesses and counsel to be heard. Furthermore, the 
reporters clustered within the bar of the small courtroom 
made confidential talk among Sheppard and his counsel 
almost impossible during the proceedings. They fre-
quently had to leave the courtroom to obtain privacy. 
And many times when counsel wished to raise a point 
with the judge out of the hearing of the jury it was 
necessary to move to the judge's chambers. Even then, 
news media representatives so packed the judge's ante-
room that counsel could hardly return from the cham-
bers to the courtroom. The reporters vied with each 
other to find out what counsel and the judge had 
discussed, and often these matters later appeared in 
newspapers accessible to the jury. 
The daily record of the proceedings was made avail-
able to the newspapers and the testimony of each wit-
ness was printed verbatim in the local editions, along 
w~th objections of counsel, and rulings by the judge. 
Pictures of Sheppard, the judge, counsel, pertinent wit-
nesses, and the jury often accompanied the daily news-
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 11 
paper and television accounts. At times the newspapers 
published photographs of exhibits introduced at the trial, 
and the rooms of Sheppard's house were featured along 
with relevant testimony. 
The jurors themselves were constantly exposed to the 
news media. Every juror, except one, testified at voir 
dire to reading about the case in the Cleveland papers 
or to having heard broadcasts about it. Seven of the 
12 jurors who rendered the verdict had one or more 
Cleveland papers delivered in their home; the remain-
ing jurors were not interrogated on the point. Nor were 
there questions as to radios or television sets in the 
talesmen's homes, but we must assume that most of 
them owned such conveniences. As the selection of the 
jury progressed, individual pictures of prospective mem-
bers appeared daily. During the trial, pictures of the 
jury appeared over 40 times in the Cleveland papers 
alone. The court permitted photographers to take pic-
tures of the jury in the box, and individual pictures of 
the members in the jury room. One newspaper ran pic-
tures of the jurors at the Sheppard home when they 
went there to view the scene of the murder. Another 
paper featured the home life of an alternate juror. The 
day before the verdict was rendered-while the jurors 
were at lunch and sequestered by two bailiffs-the jury 
was separated into two groups to pose for photographs 
which appeared in the newspapers. 
III. 
We now reach the conduct of the trial. While the 
intense publicity continued unabated, it is sufficient to 
relate only the more flagrant episodes: 
1. On October 9, 1954, nine days before the case went 
to trial, an editorial in one of the newspapers criticized 
defense counsel's random poll of people on the streets as 
to their opinion of Sheppard's guilt or innocence in an 
12 SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 
effort to use the resulting statistics to show the necessity 
for change of venue. The article said the survey "smacks 
of mass jury tampering," called on defense counsel to 
drop it, and stated that the bar association should do 
something about it. It characterized the poll as "non-
judicial, non-legal, and nonsense." The article was called 
to the attention of the court but no action was taken. 
2. On the second day of voir dire examination a debate 
was staged and broadcast live over WHK radio. The 
participants, newspaper reporters, accused Sheppard's 
counsel of throwing roadblocks in the way of the prose-
cution and asserted that Sheppard conceded his guilt by 
hiring a prominent criminal lawyer. Sheppard's counsel 
objected to this broadcast and requested a continuance, 
but the judge denied the motion. When counsel asked 
the court to give some protection from such events, the 
judge replied that "WHK doesn't have much coverage,'' 
and that "[a]fter all, we are not trying this case by radio 
or in newspapers or any other means. We confine our-
selves seriously to it in this courtroom and do the very 
best we can." 
3. While the jury was being selected, a two-inch head-
line asked: "But Who Will Speak for Marilyn?" The 
front-page story spoke of the "perfect face" of the 
accused. "Study that face as long as you want. Never 
will you get from it a hint of what might be the 
answer .... " The two brothers of the accused were 
described as "Prosperous, poised. His two sisters-in law. 
Smart, chic, well-groomed. His elderly father. Courtly, 
reserved. A perfect type for the patriarch of a staunch 
clan." The author then noted Marilyn Sheppard was 
"still off stage," and that she was an only child whose 
mother died when she was very young and whose father 
had no interest in the case. But the author-through 
quotes from Detective Chief James McArthur-assured 
readers that the prosecution's exhibits would speak for 
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 13 
Marilyn. "Her story," McArthur stated, "will come into 
this courtroom through our witnesses." The article ends: 
"Then you realize how what and who is missing 
from the perfect setting will be supplied. 
"How in the Big Case justice will be done. 
"Justice to Sam Sheppard. 
"And to Marilyn Sheppard." 
4. As has been mentioned, the jury viewed the scene 
of the murder on the first day of the trial. Hundreds of 
reporters, cameramen and onlookers were there, and one 
representative of the news media was permitted to ac-
company the jury while they inspected the Sheppard 
home. The time of the jury's visit was revealed so far 
in advance that one of the newspapers was able to rent 
a helicopter and fly over the house taking pictures of the 
jurors on their tour. 
5. On November 19, a Cleveland police officer gave 
testimony that tended to contradict details in the writ-
ten statement Sheppard made to the Cleveland police. 
Two days later, in a broadcast heard over Station 
WHK in Cleveland, Robert Considine likened Shep-
pard to a perjurer and compared the episode to Alger 
Hiss' confrontation with Whittaker Chambers. Though 
defense counsel asked the judge to question the jury to 
ascertain how many heard the broadcast, the court re-
fused to do so. The judge also overruled the motion for 
continuance based on the same ground, saying: 
"Well, I don't know, we can't stop people, in any 
event, listening to it. It is a matter of free speech, 
and the court can't control everybody. . . . We 
are not going to harass the jury every morning .... 
It is getting to the point where if we do it every 
morning, we are suspecting the jury. I have confi-
dence in this jury .... " 
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6. On November 24, a story appeared under an eight-
column headline: "Sam Called A 'Jekyll-Hyde' By 
Marilyn, Cousin To Testify." It related that Marilyn 
had recently told friends that Sheppard was a "Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde" character. No such testimony was ever 
produced at the trial. The story went on to announce: 
"The prosecution has a 'bombshell witness' on tap who 
will testify to Dr. Sam's display of fiery temper-coun-
tering the defense claim that the defendant is a gentle 
physician with an even disposition." Defense counsel 
made motions for change of venue, continuance and mis-
trial, but they were denied. No action was taken by 
the court. 
7. When the trial was in its seventh week, Walter 
Winchell broadcasted over WXEL television and W JW 
radio that Carole Beasley, who was under arrest in New 
York City for robbery, had stated that, as Sheppard's 
mistress, she had borne him a child. The defense asked 
that the jury be queried on the broadcast. Two jurors 
admitted in open court that they had heard it. The 
judge asked each: "Would that have any effect upon 
your judgment?" Both replied, "No." This was ac-
cepted by the judge as sufficient; he merely asked the 
jury to "pay no attention whatever to that type of 
scavenging ... Let's confine ourselves to this courtroom 
. ' if you please." In answer to the motion for mistrial, the 
judge said: 
"Well, even, so, Mr. Corrigan, how are you ever 
going to prevent those things, in any event? I don't 
justify them at all. I think it is outrageous, but in 
a sense, it is outrageous even if there were no trial 
here. The trial has nothing to do with it in the 
Court's mind, as far as its outrage is concerned, 
but-" 
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 15 
"Mr. CORRIGAN: I don't know what effect it had 
on the mind of any of these jurors, and I can't find 
out unless inquiry is made." 
"The CouRT: How would you ever, in any jury, 
avoid that kind of a thing?" 
8. On December 9, while Sheppard was on the witness 
stand he testified that he had been mistreated by Cleve-
land detectives after his arrest. Although he was not at 
the trial, Captain Kerr of the Homicide Bureau issued 
a press statement denying Sheppard's allegations which 
appeared under the headline: " 'Bare-faced Liar,' Kerr 
Says of Sam." Captain Kerr never appeared as a wit-
ness at the trial. 
9. After the case was submitted to the jury, it was 
sequest.ered for its deliberations, which took five days and 
four mght. After the verdict, defense counsel ascer-
tained that the jurors had been allowed to make tele-
phone calls to their homes every day while they were 
sequestered at the hotel. Although the telephones had 
been . removed from the jurors' rooms, the jurors were 
permitted to use the phones in the bailiff's rooms. The 
calls were placed by the jurors themselves; no record 
was kept of the jurors who made calls, the telephone 
numbers or the parties called. The bailiffs sat in the 
room where they could hear only the jurors' end of the 
conversation. The court had not instructed the bailiffs 
to prevent such calls. By a subsequent motion defense 
co.unsel urged that this ground alone warranted a new 
trial, but the motion was overruled and no evidence was 
taken on the question. 
IV. 
~he principle that justice cannot survive behind walls 
o~ silence has long been reflected in the "Anglo-American 
distrust for secret trials." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 
16 SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 
268 ( 1948). A responsible press has always been re-
garded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administra-
tion, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this 
regard is documented by an impressive record of service 
over several centuries. The press does not simply pub-
lish information about trials but guards against the mis-
carriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, 
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and 
criticism. This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to 
place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally 
exercised by the news media for " [ w] hat transpires in the 
court room is public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 
U. S. 367, 374 (1947). The "unqualified prohibitions 
laid down by the framers were intended to give to lib-
erty of the press . . . the broadest scope that could be 
countenanced in ail orderly society." Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U. S. 252, 265 (1941). And where there 
was "no threat or menace to the integrity of the trial," 
Craig v. Harney, supra, at 377, we have consistently 
required that the press have a free hand, even though 
we sometimes deplored its sensationalism. 
But the Court has also pointed out that "[l] egal trials 
are not like elections, to be won through the use of the 
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper." Bridges 
v. Californfo, supra, at 271. And the Court has insisted 
that no one be punished for a crime without "a charge 
fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of 
prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyranical power." 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236-237 (1940). 
"Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range 
compatible with the essential requirement of the fair 
and orderly administration of justice." . Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 347 (1946). But it must not 
be allowed to divert the trial from the "very purpose of a 
court system ... to adjudicate controversies, both crim-
inal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the 
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courtroom according to legal procedures." Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U. S. 559, 583 (1965) (BLACK, J., dissenting). 
Among these "legal procedures" is the requirement that 
the jury's verdict be based on evidence received in open 
court, not from outside sources. Thus, in Marshall v. 
United States, 360 U. S. 310 (1959), we set aside a 
federal conviction where the jurors were exposed "through 
news accounts" to information that was not admitted at 
trial. We held that the prejudice from such material 
"may indeed be greater" than when it is part of the prose-
cution's evidence "for it is then not tempered by pro-
tective procedures." At 313. At the same time, we did 
not consider dispositive the statement of each juror "that 
he would not be influenced by the news articles, that he 
could decide the case only on the evidence of record, and 
that he felt no prejudice against petitioner as a result of 
the articles." At 312. Likewise, in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U. S. 717 (1961), even though each juror indicated that 
he could render an impartial verdict despite exposure to 
prejudicial newspaper articles, we set aside the conviction 
holding: 
"With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much 
that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undis-
turbed by so huge a wave of public passion .... " 
At 728. 
The undeviating rule of this Court was expressed by 
Mr. Justice Holmes over half a century ago in Patterson 
v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907): 
"The theory of our system is that the conclusions 
to be reached in a case will be induced only by 
evidence and argument in open court, and not by 
any outside influence, whether of private talk or 
public print." 
Moreover, "the burden of showing essential unfair-
ness ... as a demonstrable reality," Adams v. United 
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States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 281 (1942), need 
not be undertaken when television has exposed the com-
munity "repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of [the 
accused] personally confessing in detail to the crimes 
with which he was later to be charged." Rideau v. 
Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963). In Turner v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), two key witnesses were 
deputy sheriffs who doubled as jury shepherds during 
the trial. The deputies swore that they had not talked 
to the jurors about the case, but the Court nonetheless 
held that, 
"even if it could be assumed that the deputies 
never did discuss the case directly with any mem-
bers of the jury, it would be blinking reality not to 
recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this 
continual association .... " At 473. 
Only last Term in Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 
( 1965), we set aside a conviction despite the absence of 
any showing of prejudice. We said there: 
"It is true that in most cases involving claims of 
due process deprivations we require a showing of 
identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, 
at times a procedure employed by the State involves 
such a probability that prejudice will result that it 
is deemed inherently lacking in due process." At 
542-543. 
And we cited with approval the language of MR. JusTICE 
BLACK for the Court in In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 
136 ( 1955), that "our system of law has always en-
deavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." 
v. 
It is clear that the totality of circumstances in this case 
also warrant such an approach. Unlike Estes, Sheppard 
was not granted a change of venue to,a locale away from 
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where the publicity originated; nor was his jury seques-
tered. The Estes jury saw none of the television broad-
casts from the courtroom. On the contrary, the Sheppard 
jurors were subjected to newspaper, radio and television 
coverage of the trial while not taking part in the proceed-
ings. They were allowed to go their separate ways out-
side of the courtroom, without adequate directions not to 
read or listen to anything concerning the case. The 
judge's "admonitions" at the beginning of the trial are 
representative: 
"I would suggest to you and caution you that you 
do not read any newspapers during the progress of 
this trial .. that you do not listen to radio comments 
nor watch or listen to television comments, insofar 
as this case is concerned. You will feel very much 
better as the trial proceeds . . . . I am sure that 
we shall all feel very much better if we do not in-
dulge in any newspaper reading or listening to any 
comments whatever about the matter while the case 
is in progress. After it is all over, you can read it 
all to your heart's content . . . ." 
At intervals during the trial, the judge simply repeated 
his "suggestions" and "requests" that the jury not ex-
pose themselves to comment upon the case. Moreover, 
the jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by the 
judge's failure to insulate them from reporters and pho-
tographers. See Estes v. Texas, supra, at 545-546. The 
numerous pictures of the jurors, with their addresses, 
which appeared in the newspapers before and during the 
trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion from 
both cranks and friends. The fact that anonymous let-
ters had been received by prospective jurors should have 
made the judge aware that this publicity seriously threat-
ened the jurors' privacy. 
The press coverage of the Estes trial was not nearly 
as massive and pervasive as the attention given by the 
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Cleveland newspapers and broadcasting stations to Shep-
pard's prosecution.8 Sheppard stood indicted for the 
murder of his wife; the State was demanding the death 
penalty. For months the virulent publicity about Shep-
pard and the murder had made the case notorious. 
Charges and countercharges were aired in the news media 
besides those for which Sheppard was called to trial. In 
addition, only three months before trial, Sheppard was 
examined for more than five hours without counsel dur-
ing a three-day inquest which ended in a public brawl. 
The inquest was televised live from a high school gym-
nasium seating hundreds of people. Furthermore, the 
trial began two weeks before a hotly contested election at 
which both Chief Prosecutor Mahon and Judge Blythin 
were candidates for judgeships.9 
While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due 
process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against 
the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later 
rulings must be considered against the setting in which 
8 Many more reporters and photographers attended the Sheppard 
trial. And it attracted several nationally famous commentators 
as well. 
9 At the commencement of trial, defense counsel made motions 
for continuance and change of venue. The judge postponed ruling 
on these motions until he determined whether an impartial jury 
could be impaneled. Vair dire examination showed that with one 
exception all members selected for jury service had read something 
about the case in the newspapers. Since, however, all of the jurors 
stated that they would not be influenced by what they had read or 
seen, the judge overruled both of the motions. Without regard to 
whether the judge's actions in this respect reach dimensions that 
would justify issuance of the habeas writ, it should be noted that a 
short continuance would have alleviatE'd any problem with regard to 
the judicial elections. The court in Delaney v. United States, 199 F. 
2d 107, 115 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1952), recognized such a duty under 
similar circumstances, holding that "if assurance of a fair trial would 
necessitate that the trial of the case be postponed until after the 
election, then we think the law required no less than that." 
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the trial was held. In light of this background, we 
believe that the arrangements made by the judge with 
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of 
that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was 
entitled." Estes v. Texas, supra, at 536. The fact is 
that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial 
and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, 
hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially 
Sheppard. At a temporary table within a few feet of the 
jury box and counsel table sat some 20 reporters staring 
at Sheppard and taking notes. The erection of a press 
table for reporters inside the bar is unprecedented. The 
bar of the court is reserved for counsel, providing them a 
safe place in which to keep papers and exhibits, and to 
confer privately with client and co-counsel. It is de-
signed to protect the witness and the jury from any dis-
tractions, intrusions or influences, and to permit bench 
discussions of the judge's rulings away from the hearing 
of the public and the jury. Having assigned almost all 
of the available seats in the courtroom to the news media 
the judge lost his ability to supervise that environment. 
The movement of the reporters in and out of the court-
room caused frequent confusion and disruption of the 
trial. And the record reveals constant commotion within 
the bar. Moreover, the judge gave the throng of news-
men gathered in the corridors of the courthouse absolute 
free rein. Participants in the trial, including the jury, 
were forced to run a gantlet of reporters and photog-
raphers each time they entered or left the courtroom. 
The total lack of consideration for the privacy of the 
jury was demonstrated by the assignment to a broad-
casting station of space next to the jury room on the 
floor above the courtroom, as well as the fact that jurors 
were allowed to make telephone calls during their five-
day deliberation. 
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VI. 
There can be no question about the nature of the pub-
licity which surrounded Sheppard's trial. We agree, as 
did the Court of Appeals, with the findings in Judge Bell's 
opinion for the Ohio Supreme Court: 
"Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense 
were combined in this case in such a manner as to 
intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a degree 
perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Through-
out the preindictment investigation, the subsequent 
legal skirmishes and the nine-week trial, circulation-
conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest 
of the American public in the bizarre. . . . In this 
atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for the news media, 
Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life." 165 Ohio 
St., at 294. 
Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save 
the court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which 
the news media inflamed and prejudiced the public.10 
Much of the material printed or broadcast during the 
trial was never heard from the witness stand, such as 
the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the 
murder investigation and must be guilty since he had 
10 Typical comments on the trial by the press itself include: 
"The question of Dr. Sheppard's guilt or innocence still is before 
the courts. Those who have examined the trial record carefully are 
divided as to the propriety of the verdict. But almost everyone 
who watched the performance of the Cleveland press agrees that a 
fair hearing for the defendant, in that area, would be a modern 
miracle." Harrison, "The Press vs. the Courts," The Saturday 
Review (Oct. 15, 1955). 
"At this distance, some 100 miles from Cleveland, it looks to us 
as though the Sheppard murder case was sensationalized to the point 
at which the press must ask itself if its freedom, carried to excess, 
doesn't interfere with the conduct of fair trials." Editorial, The 
TolC'do Blade (Dec. 22, 1954). 
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hired a prominent criminal lawyer; that Sheppard was 
a perjurer; that he had sexual relations with numerous 
women; that his slain wife had characterized him as a 
"Jekyll-Hyde"; that he was "a bare-faced liar" because 
of his testimony as to police treatment; and, finally, 
that a woman convict claimed Sheppard to be the father 
of her illegitimate child. As the trial progressed, the 
newspapers summarized and interpreted the evidence, 
devoting particular attention to the material that incrim-
inated Sheppard, and often drew unwarranted inferences 
from testimony. At one point, a front-page picture of 
Mrs. Sheppard's blood-stained pillow was published after 
being "doctored" to show more clearly an alleged imprint 
of a surgical instrument. 
Nor is there doubt that this deluge of publicity 
reached at least some of the jury. On the only occa-
sion that the jury was queried, two jurors admitted in 
open court to hearing the highly inflammatory charge 
that a prison inmate claimed Sheppard as the father 
of her illegitimate child. Despite the extent and nature 
of the publicity to which the jury was exposed dur-
ing trial, the judge refused defense counsel's other re-
quests that the jury be asked whether they had read 
or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case in-
cluding the incidents we have previously summarized. 
In these circumstances, we can assume that some of 
this material reached members of the jury. See Com-
monwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N. E. 2d 923 
(1963). 
VII. 
The court's fundamental error is compounded by the 
holding tha~ it lacked power to control the publicity 
~bout the .trial. From the very inception of the proceed-
mgs the Judge announced that neither he nor anyone 
else could restrict prejudicial news accounts. And he 
24 SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL. 
reiterated this view on numerous occasions. Since he 
viewed the news media as his target, the judge never 
considered other means that are often utilized to reduce 
the appearance of prejudicial material and to protect 
the jury from outside influence. We conclude that these 
procedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Shep-
pard a fair trial and so do not consider what sanctions 
might be available against a recalcitrant press nor the 
charges of bias now made against the state trial judge.11 
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been 
avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are 
subject to the control of the court. As we stressed in 
Estes, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings 
must be limited when it is apparent that the accused 
might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged.12 Bear-
ing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge 
should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of 
the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel re-
quested. The number of reporters in the courtroom 
itself could have been limited at the first sign that their 
presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should 
not have been placed inside the bar. Furthermore the 
judge should have more closely regulated the co~duct 
of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge 
belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial 
exhibits laying on the counsel table during recesses. 
11 In an unsworn statement, which the parties agreed would have 
the status of a deposition, made 10 years after Sheppard's convic-
tion and six years after Judge Blythin's death, Dorothy Kilgallen 
asserted that Judge Blythin had told her: "It's an open and shut 
case ... he is guilty as hf>ll." It is thus urged that Sheppard be 
released on the ground that the judge's bias infected the entire trial. 
~ut we need not reach this argument, since the judge's failure to 
~nsulate the p:oceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive 
m~~ences. depr'.ved ~heppard of _the chanc_e to :eceive a fair hearing. 
The Judge s a\\ areness of his power 111 this respect is manifest 
from his assignment of seats to the press. 
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Secondly, the court should have insulated the witnesses. 
All of the newspapers and radio stations apparently inter-
viewed prospective witnesses at will, and in many in-
stances disclosed their testimony. A typical example 
was the publication of numerous statements by Susan 
Hayes, before her appearance in court, regarding her love 
affair with Sheppard. Although the witnesses were 
barred from the courtroom during the trial the full 
verbatim testimony was available to them in the press. 
Thie completely nullified the judge's imposition of the 
rule. See Estes v. Tex<M, supra, at 547. 
Thirdly, the court should have made some effort to con-
trol the release of leads, information, and gossip to the 
press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for 
both sides. Much of the information thus disclosed was 
inaccurate, leading to groundless rumors and confusion.13 
That the judge was aware of his responsibility in this 
respect may be seen from his warning to Steve Shep-
pard: the accused's brother, who had apparently made 
public statements in an attempt to discredit testimony 
for the prosecution. The judge made this statement in 
the presence of the jury: 
"Now, the court wants to say a word. That he 
was told-he has not read anything about it at all-
but he was informed that Dr. Steve Sheppard, who 
1
•
3 The problem here was further complicated by the independent 
act10n of the newspapers in reporting "evidence" and gossip which 
th~y uncovered. The press not only inferred that Sheppard was 
gmlty .because he "stalled" the investigation, hid behind his family 
~nd hired a prominent criminal lawyer, but denounced as "mas~ 
J~ry tampering" his efforts to gather evidence of community preju-
dice caused by such publications. Sheppard's counterattacks added 
some .fuel .but~ in these circumstances, cannot preclude him from 
asse~tmg his right to a fair trial. Putting to one side news stories 
attnbuted to pol~ce. offici~ls, prospective witnesses, the Sheppards, 
and the lawyers, 1t is possible that the other publicity "would itself 
~ave had a prejudicial effect." Report of the President's Commis-
sion on the Assassination of President Kennedy, at 239. 
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has been granted the privilege of remaining in the 
courtroom during the trial, has been trying the case 
in the newspapers and making rather uncompli-
mentary comments about the testimony of the wit-
nesses for the State. 
"Let it be now understood that if Dr. Steve Shep-
pard wishes to use the newspapers to try his case 
while we are trying it here, he will be barred from 
remaining in the courtroom during the progress of 
the trial if he is to be a witness in the case. 
"The Court appreciates he cannot deny Steve 
Sheppard the right of free speech, but he can deny 
him the ... privilege of being in the courtroom, 
if he wants to avail himself of that method during 
the progress of the trial." 
Defense counsel immediately brought to the court's atten-
tion the tremendous amount of publicity in the Cleveland 
press that "misrepresented entirely the testimony" in the 
case. Under such circumstances, the judge should have 
at least warned the newspapers to check the accuracy 
of their accounts. And it is obvious that the judge 
should have further sought to alleviate this problem by 
imposing control over the statements made to the news 
media by counsel, witnesses, and especially the Coroner 
and police officers. The prosecution repeatedly made 
evidence available to the news media which was never 
offered in the trial. Much of the "evidence" dissemi-
nated in this fashion was clearly inadmissible. The ex-
clusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless 
when a news media makes it available to the public. For 
example, the publicity about Sheppard's refusal to take 
a lie detector test came directly from police officers and 
the Coroner.14 The story that Sheppard had been called 
14 When two police officers testified at trial that Sheppard refused 
to take a lie detector test, the judge declined to give a requested 
instruction that the results of such a test would be inadmissible 
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a "Jekyll-Hyde" personality by his wife was attributed 
to a prosecution witness. No such testimony was given. 
The further report that there was "a 'bombshell witness' 
on tap" who would testify as to Sheppard's "fiery tem-
per" could only have emanated from the prosecution. 
Moreover, the newspapers described in detail clues that 
had been found by the police, but not put. into the 
record.15 
The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can 
be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense, aggra-
vates the judge's failure to take any action. See Stroble 
v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). Effective control of these sources-conced-
edly within the court's power-might well have pre-
vented the divulgence of inaccurate information rumors 
' ' and accusations that made up much of the inflammatory 
publicity, at least after Sheppard's indictment. 
More specifically, the trial court might well have pro-
sc:ibed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party, 
witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial 
matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to 
interrogation or take any lie detector tests; any state-
ment made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of pro-
spective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief 
in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the 
merits of the case. See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N. J. 369, 
389, 204 A. 2d 841, 850 (1964), in which the court inter-
preted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association.'s Can-
ons of Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements. 
in any event. He simply told the jury that no person has an obli-
gation "to take any lie detector test." 
15 Such "premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence" m1w 
seriously jeopardize a defendant's right to an impartial jun:. 
"[NJ either the press nor the public had a right to be contemp~­
raneously informed by the police or prosecuting authorities of the 
details of the evidence being accumulated against [Sheppard]." 
Report of the President's Commission, at 239-240. 
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Being advised of the great public interest in the case, the 
mass coverage of the press, and the potential prejudicial 
impact of publicity, the court could also have requested 
the appropriate city and county officials to promulgate 
a regulation with respect to dissemination of information 
about the case by their employees.16 In addition, re-
porters who wrote or broadcasted prejudicial stories, 
could have been warned as to the impropriety of publish-
ing material not introduced in the proceedings. The 
judge was put on notice of such events by defense coun-
sel's complaint about the WHK broadcast on the second 
day of trial. See p. 11, supra. In this manner, Shep-
pard's right to a trial free from outside interference 
would have been given added protection without cor-
responding curtailment of the news media. Had the 
judge, the other officers of the court, and the police 
placed the interest of justice first, the news media would 
have soon learned to be content with the task of report-
ing the case as it unfolded in the courtroom-not pieced 
together from extra-judicial statements. 
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and 
prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become 
increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the 
accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from 
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern 
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial 
publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts 
must take strong measures to ensure that the balance 
is never weighed against the accused. And appellate 
tribunals have the duty to make an independent evalua-
tion of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing 
16 The Department of Justice, the City of New York, and other 
governmental agencies have issued such regulations. E. g., 28 CFR 
§ 50.2 (1966). For general information on this topic see periodic 
publications (e. g., Nos. 71, 124, and 158) by the Freedom of Infor-
mation Center, School of .Journalism, Universit~· of Missouri. 
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that proscribes the press from reporting events that tran-
spire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable 
likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will pre-
vent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until 
the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so 
permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration of 
the jury was something the judge should have raised sua 
sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceed-
ings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should 
be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are 
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures 
that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The 
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that 
will protect their processes from prejudicial outside inter-
ferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the 
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers 
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be per-
mitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between 
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fair-
ness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regu-
lation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary 
measures. 
Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to 
protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial pub-
licity which saturated the community and to control dis-
ruptive influences in the courtroom, we must reverse the 
denial of the habeas petition. The case is remanded to 
the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and 
order that Sheppard be released from custody unless the 
State puts him to its charges again within a reasonable 
time. It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE BLACK dissents. 
